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HFC SMUGGLING: PREVENTING THE 
ILLICIT (AND LUCRATIVE) SALE OF 
GREENHOUSE GASES 
GRAHAM DONNELLY WELCH* 
Abstract: The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that 
Deplete the Ozone Layer is a pivotal development in global cooperation to stem 
climate change. Through incorporating hydrofluorocarbons into the Montreal 
Protocol, the international community will be able to combat the deleterious ef-
fects of a common, yet potent, chemical. Nonetheless, the United States and its 
fellow parties will likely have to combat an illicit trade in these banned sub-
stances in the immediate future. Through lessons learned from the original Mon-
treal Protocol, the United States can effectively combat smuggling and ensure 
the Kigali Amendment’s success. 
INTRODUCTION 
As Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Lee Thom-
as explained, “we may need to act in the near term to avoid letting today’s 
‘risk’ become tomorrow’s ‘crisis.’”1 This statement typified the mindset of 
preemptive action that led to the watershed agreement of the Montreal Pro-
tocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (“Montreal Protocol”).2 
The Montreal Protocol successfully achieved near universal agreement to 
remove chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”).3 In the wake of the Montreal Proto-
col’s regulation of CFCs a vast international black market emerged for these 
                                                                                                                           
 * Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2016–2017. 
 1 KAREN T. LITFIN, OZONE DISCOURSES: SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN GLOBAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL COOPERATION 103 (1994) (citing Paul Brodeur, Annals of Chemistry: In the Face of Doubt, 
NEW YORKER, June 1986, at 73, 86). 
 2 See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Preamble, Sept. 16, 
1987, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-10 (1987), 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol]; LIT-
FIN, supra note 1, at 103; Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). 
 3 Elizabeth R. DeSombre, The Experience of the Montreal Protocol: Particularly Remarka-
ble, and Remarkably Predictable, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 49, 49 (2001); Justin Gillis, 
The Montreal Protocol: A Little Treaty That Could, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2013, at D3; see infra 
notes 27–49 and accompanying text (providing an overview of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”) and 
their impact on the ozone layer). 
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chemicals.4 The treaty’s massive reduction of legal CFCs, led to increased 
demand for an illegal replacement.5 In the words of one assistant United 
States Attorney, importers of illegal CFCs received “a better return on their 
investment than cocaine” through smuggled chemicals.6 
After instituting official restrictions on the production, consumption, 
and transport of ozone depleting chemicals, governments struggled to pre-
pare for the subsequent threat of CFC smuggling.7 Enterprising criminals 
capitalized on inefficiencies in federal and international enforcement mech-
anisms and imported the chemicals to buyers within the United States.8 De-
veloped nations, such as the United States, failed to fully stem the produc-
tion of CFCs by providing inadequate support to developing nations in their 
efforts to combat CFC production, and insufficiently punishing defection 
from the international agreement.9 Although the United States largely suc-
ceeded in finally combating this black market, the delay came at the cost of 
continued depletion to the Earth’s ozone layer.10 
The danger of an analogous substance, hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”), 
in the atmosphere poses a significant threat to the earth by exacerbating 
global warming and requires a forceful response.11 On October 15, 2016, in 
Kigali, Rwanda, the signatory nations of the Montreal Protocol finalized an 
amendment to the agreement structuring a phase-out of HFCs, making a 
significant step toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions (“Kigali Amend-
ment”).12 With the agreement to reduce HFCs comes the threat of smuggling 
                                                                                                                           
 4 United States v. LeBlanc, 169 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1999); Timothy T. Jones, Implementa-
tion of the Montreal Protocol: Barriers, Constraints and Opportunities, 3 ENVTL. LAW. 813, 830 
(1997). 
 5 Alex Nussbaum, World’s Worst Greenhouse Gas Spurs Global Smuggling Rings, BLOOM-
BERG (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-30/world-s-worst-
greenhouse-gas-spurs-global-smuggling-rings [https://perma.cc/T6V6-KSBE]. 
 6 Id. 
 7 See infra notes 90–125 and accompanying text (outlining the rise of CFC smuggling opera-
tions and subsequent government efforts to combat this illicit trade, including the challenges law 
enforcement faced). 
 8 Saleem S. Saab, Move Over Drugs, There’s Something Cooler on the Black Market—Freon: 
Can the New Licensing System Stop Illegal CFC Trafficking?, 16 DICK. J. INT’L L. 633, 652–53 
(1998). 
 9 Nina E. Bafundo, Comment, Compliance with the Ozone Treaty: Weak States and the Prin-
ciple of Common but Differentiated Responsibility, 21 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 461, 493–94 (2006). 
 10 Frederick Poole Landers, Jr., Note, The Black Market Trade in Chlorofluorocarbons: The 
Montreal Protocol Makes Banned Refrigerants a Hot Commodity, 26 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
457, 478 (1997). 
 11 See DeSombre, supra note 3, at 64. 
 12 U.N. Env’t Programme, Report of the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.28/12, Annex I 
(Nov. 15, 2016) [hereinafter Kigali Amendment]; Coral Davenport, Nations, Fighting Powerful Re-
frigerant That Warms Planet, Reach Landmark Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/10/15/world/africa/kigali-deal-hfc-air-conditioners.html [https://perma.cc/4PGF-
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of these chemicals.13 The United States and other members of the interna-
tional community will have a chance to heed the lessons of CFC reduction 
as they work to diminish another environmentally dangerous chemical, 
HFCs.14 
In Part I, this Note will provide an overview of the threat of ozone de-
pletion, specifically from CFCs and other ozone depleting substances 
(“ODSs”).15 Next, it will detail the multilateral efforts to combat ozone de-
pletion, which ultimately resulted in the landmark enactment of the Montre-
al Protocol.16 This Note will describe how the United States incorporated 
the Montreal Protocol’s terms into domestic law.17 This Note will then ex-
plain how, despite this international and domestic legal structure, illegal 
smuggling of CFCs threatened the success of the Montreal Protocol.18 This 
Note will then explain the new environmentally-detrimental chemical added 
into the Montreal Protocol’s schema: HFCs.19 Finally, Part I concludes with 
a discussion of how the Kigali Amendment addresses HFC reduction across 
the globe.20 
Part II of this Note will argue that, as the United States and other nations 
prepare to curb the dangerous effects of HFCs through the Kigali Amend-
ment, policy makers should adopt a proactive strategy to prevent the illicit 
trade of environmentally dangerous chemicals.21 While the Kigali Amend-
ment did fail to address all of the risks of possible HFC smuggling, particular-
ly through extended grace periods for developing states, this Note will ex-
plain that it does not preclude effective enforcement of anti-smuggling ef-
                                                                                                                           
U9TF]; Aaron Messing, The New Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol Takes Positive Steps 
to Curb Potent Greenhouse Emitter, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. (Oct. 30, 2016), https://gelr.org/2016/10/
30/the-new-kigali-amendment-to-the-montreal-protocol-takes-positive-steps-to-curb-potent-green
house-emitter/ [https://perma.cc/74CG-ENEA] (published online as part of the journal’s digital sup-
plement). See generally U.N. Env’t Programme, Report of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Parties 
to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, U.N. Doc. UNEP/
OzL.Pro.27/13 (Nov. 30, 2015) [hereinafter Report of the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Parties to 
the Montreal Protocol] (presenting the results of the 2015 Dubai meeting of Montreal Protocol Par-
ties as they prepared for the Kigali Amendment). 
 13 See ENVTL. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, WHEELS IN MOTION: TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL 
PHASE-DOWN OF HFCS 12–14 (Oct. 22, 2013), https://eia-global.org/reports/wheels-in-motion-
towards-an-international-phase-down-of-hfcs [https://perma.cc/G8BX-KKTK] [hereinafter WHEELS 
IN MOTION] (a PDF of the report is available as a navigable document embedded in the webpage). 
 14 Veronica Kennedy, The Montreal Protocol: Fit for Hydroflurocarbons, 12 SUSTAINABLE 
DEV. L. & POL’Y, Winter 2012, at 25, 25; see infra notes 110–125 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 27–49 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 50–74 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 75–89 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 90–124 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 126–144 and accompanying text. 
 20 See infra notes 145–169 and accompanying text. 
 21 See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 25; infra notes 170–184 and accompanying text.. 
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forts.22 This Note will then explain how the destruction of HFC “banks” can 
serve as a proactive measure against smuggling.23 Next, this Note will look to 
domestic law and international agreements, specifically the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and the Convention on International 
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (“CITES”) for lessons 
on enforcement of environmental prohibitions.24 Finally, this Note will ex-
plain the consequences of inaction if the United States and the international 
community fail to adequately combat HFC smuggling.25 Ultimately, this Note 
concludes that the parties of the Montreal Protocol have made a significant 
accomplishment towards combating climate change through the Kigali 
Amendment, and the prevention of HFC smuggling will be a major step in 
the execution of the agreement.26 
I. MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT OZONE DEPLETION AND THE RISE 
OF ILLICIT CHEMICAL SMUGGLING 
A. The Importance of Ozone and the Environmental Threat  
of Ozone Depleting Substances 
1. Ozone and the Effects of Ultraviolet Radiation 
The ozone layer is a thin band of accumulated ozone, a compound 
made of three oxygen molecules, located in the stratosphere layer of the 
Earth’s atmosphere.27 Within the stratosphere, ozone plays an essential role 
in the health of terrestrial ecosystems.28 These ozone molecules absorb ul-
traviolet (“UV”) radiation emitted by the sun.29 Although the UV rays dis-
solve the ozone compounds, the oxygen molecules largely reform into new 
ozone that can absorb further radiation.30 The process is largely stable, ex-
cept when the ozone is broken apart by unnatural chemical compounds, 
such as chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”).31 
                                                                                                                           
 22 See infra notes 185–204 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 217–226 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 227–232 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 233–244 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 170–176 and accompanying text. 
 27 Anne Gallagher, The “New” Montreal Protocol and the Future of International Law for 
Protection of the Global Environment, 14 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 267, 270 (1992). 
 28 Orval E. Nangle, Stratospheric Ozone: United States Regulation of Chlorofluorocarbons, 
16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 531, 535 (1989). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. at 537. 
 31 Glenn B. Raiczyk, Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer: Con-
ference Calling for Accelerated Phase-Out of Ozone-Depleting Chemicals Is Planned for 1992, 5 
TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 363, 366 (1992). 
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Ozone’s UV-absorbing function is vitally important to both the preser-
vation of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems and to public health.32 Without a 
functioning ozone layer, the sun’s UV rays can penetrate the Earth’s atmos-
phere.33 UV exposure is particularly dangerous for humans, as it has been 
directly linked with non-melanoma skin cancers, decreased immune system 
function, and eye damage.34  
In addition to the deleterious impacts on human health, UV radiation 
can have a strong adverse impact on the global environment.35 For instance, 
UV radiation can affect the productivity of agricultural products and other 
plant-based life, and it can also cause adverse health effects for terrestrial 
animals.36 Furthermore, UV rays can penetrate more than ten meters into 
clear bodies of water, reducing the regenerative abilities and growth of phy-
toplankton, which are crucial to many ecosystems.37 Fortunately for humans 
and all members of the terrestrial ecosystem, a functioning ozone layer pro-
vides protection from these dangers.38 
2. Development and Proliferation of CFCs 
CFCs do not occur naturally in the Earth’s atmosphere; rather, they are 
synthetic chemicals that were once prominent and lucrative components of 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Gallagher, supra note 27, at 273. Terrestrial ecosystems consist of the interactions of flora 
and fauna that occur in an area on land, in contrast with aquatic ecosystems. See Michael T. Pyle, 
Note, Beyond Fish Ladders: Dam Removal as a Strategy for Restoring America’s Rivers, 14 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 112–14 (1995).   
 33 Gallagher, supra note 27, at 273. 
 34 ARJUN MAKHIJANI & KEVIN R. GURNEY, MENDING THE OZONE HOLE: SCIENCE, TECH-
NOLOGY, AND POLICY 73–75 (1995); Nancy D. Adams, Title VI of the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments and State and Local Initiatives to Reverse the Stratospheric Ozone Crisis: An Analy-
sis of Preemption, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173, 175–76 (1991); Sumudu Atapattu, The Pub-
lic Health Impact of Global Environmental Problems and the Role of International Law, 30 AM. 
J.L. & MED. 283, 289 (2004); Nangle, supra note 28, at 537–38. 
 35 Gallagher, supra note 27, at 273. 
 36 Adams, supra 34, at 176. 
 37 DONAT-P. HÄDER, THE EFFECTS OF OZONE DEPLETION ON AQUATIC SYSTEMS 12, 15 (1st 
ed. 1997). Phytoplankton, a microscopic form of oceanic plant life, plays a valuable role in the 
preservation of ocean ecosystems. Robin Kundis Craig, Ocean Governance for the 21st Century: 
Making Marine Zoning Climate Change Adaptable, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 305, 323 (2012). 
Not only do these microscopic plants serve as core components of aquatic ecosystems as a food 
source for other life forms, but phytoplankton also have the environmental benefit of absorbing 
the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide during photosynthesis, thereby removing it from the atmos-
phere. Daniel P. Larsen, Combatting the Exotic Species Invasion: The Role of Tort Liability, 5 
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 21, 24 (1995); Grant Wilson, Murky Waters: Ambiguous Interna-
tional Law for Ocean Fertilization and Other Geoengineering, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 507, 516 
(2014). 
 38 See ANNIKA NILSSON, ULTRAVIOLET REFLECTIONS: LIFE UNDER A THINNING OZONE 
LAYER 15–16 (1996). 
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industrial equipment.39 Frequently known by their brand name, Freon, 
CFCs are halocarbon compounds that combine with other halogen gases 
and vaporize at low temperatures.40 When they were first invented in the 
1930s, CFCs were a replacement for other refrigerant chemicals such as 
ether vapor, ammonia, and sulfur dioxide, all of which were much more 
unstable and dangerous to humans.41 By the 1980s, CFCs were used in the 
United States for a variety of purposes, but primarily as coolants in domes-
tic and automobile air conditioners, propellants in aerosol spray cans and 
fire extinguishers, and computer hardware.42 As the possible applications 
for CFCs proliferated, so too did their demand—by the late 1980s, world-
wide consumption of the chemicals totaled approximately 1.1 million met-
ric tons.43 
3. The Rowland-Molina Hypothesis and the Adverse Atmospheric Impact 
of CFCs 
Despite their industrial and consumer benefits, CFCs also had major 
unintended environmental consequences.44 CFCs significantly threatened 
the protection provided by the ozone layer.45 The link between ozone deple-
tion and CFCs first became known in 1974, when atmospheric researchers 
Sherwood Rowland and Marion Molina published their theory about the 
impact of CFCs on the ozone layer.46 Specifically, Rowland and Molina 
hypothesized that CFCs and other ozone depleting substances (“ODSs”) 
remained in the atmosphere for extended periods of time, ultimately react-
                                                                                                                           
 39 Pamela Wexler, Protecting the Global Atmosphere: Beyond the Montreal Protocol, 14 MD. 
J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1, 3 (1990); Douglas Hunter Ogden, Comment, The Montreal Protocol: Con-
fronting the Threat to Earth’s Ozone Layer, 63 WASH. L. REV. 997, 999 (1988). 
 40 Adams, supra note 34, at 177; Jones, supra note 4, at 830 n.20. 
 41 Raiczyk, supra note 31, at 365. 
 42 Id. at 366. 
 43 Landers, supra note 10, at 460. CFC production peaked in 1974, following an annual in-
crease in production of approximately thirteen percent per year from 1960 to 1974. Joanne 
Kauffman, Domestic and International Linkages in Global Environmental Politics: A Case-Study 
of the Montreal Protocol, in THE INTERNALIZATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 74, 76 
(Miranda A. Scheurs & Elizabeth Economy, eds., 1997) 
 44 See Raiczyk, supra note 31, at 366. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Mario J. Molina & F. S. Rowland, Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluoromethanes: Chlorine 
Atom-Catalysed Destruction of Ozone, 249 NATURE 810, 810 (1974); Laura Thoms, A Compara-
tive Analysis of International Regimes on Ozone and Climate Change with Implications for Re-
gime Design, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 795, 799 (2003). Molina and Rowland were ultimate-
ly awarded the 1995 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for their research related to the ozone layer. Jona-
than Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context, 108 
YALE L.J. 677, 686 n.30. (1999). 
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ing with ozone molecules to break down the ozone.47 The disintegration of 
CFCs in the upper atmosphere released large quantities of chlorine atoms, 
which could destroy large quantities of ozone molecules.48 Rowland and 
Molina’s report made global leaders more aware of the threat of sustained 
ozone depletion, but remained uncertain as to any definitive link between 
ozone depletion and chemical usage.49 
B. Initial International Recognition of the Threat of Ozone  
Depletion and the Vienna Convention 
The international community first collectively addressed ozone deple-
tion and its impact on humans in 1985, when forty-three countries signed 
the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (“Vienna 
Convention”).50 At the convention, signatory nations worked under an un-
derstanding that ozone depletion was a significant environmental and public 
health problem, ultimately establishing a framework for information shar-
ing, increased monitoring, and setting the stage for further talks on halting 
ozone depletion.51 Nevertheless, the Vienna Convention did not establish 
any concrete regulations on CFC usage, as delegate nations remained uncer-
tain of the science linking CFCs and ozone depletion.52 Despite the dele-
gates’ uncertainty as to the specific effects of CFC use in disintegrating the 
ozone layer, the Vienna Convention provided a mechanism to measure its 
effects, with the ultimate goal to combat the problem of CFC-related ozone 
depletion with full information.53 
As the effects of CFC exposure on the ozone layer and the effects of 
ozone depletion became more accepted, the international community began 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Bing Ling, Developing Countries and Ozone Layer Protection: Issues, Principles, and 
Implications, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 93 (1992). 
 48 ANDREW DESSLER, THE CHEMISTRY AND PHYSICS OF STRATOSPHERIC OZONE 61–62 
(2000). 
 49 David Hurlbut, Beyond the Montreal Protocol: Impact on Nonparty States and Lessons for 
Future Environmental Protection Regimes, 4 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 344, 346 (1993). 
 50 Ling, supra note 47, at 94. Ultimately, twenty countries and the European Community 
signed the Vienna Convention. Id. 
 51 Brett Frischmann, A Dynamic Institutional Theory of International Law, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 
679, 791–92 (2003). 
 52 Id. This reluctance to accept a definitive link between CFCs and ozone depletion was evi-
dent in the text of the Vienna Convention itself, which never explicitly linked any particular sub-
stance to ozone depletion. RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY: NEW DIRECTIONS 
IN SAFEGUARDING THE PLANET 45 (2d ed. 1998). 
 53 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, art. 2, sec. 1, Mar. 22, 1985, S. 
TREATY DOC. 99-9, 1513 U.N.T.S. 293; Frischmann, supra note 51, at 792; see Anthony E. 
Chavez, A Napoleonic Approach to Climate Change: The Geoengineering Branch, 5 WASH. & 
LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 93, 145–46 (2013) (describing the Vienna Convention and 
Montreal Protocol’s focus on regulating materials harmful to the ozone layer). 
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both individual and cooperative efforts to curb the problem.54 In 1977, the 
United States largely restricted the use of CFCs in aerosol spray cans fol-
lowing a report linking CFCs to ozone depletion.55 By 1982, Canada and 
the European Community instituted their own restrictions of CFCs in aero-
sols.56 Despite these individual efforts, ozone depletion remained a global 
issue with a global cause, and the international community sought a multi-
lateral solution.57 
The Vienna Convention set the stage for further multilateral agree-
ments to combat ozone depletion, requesting the Executive Director of the 
United Nations Environmental Programme (“UNEP”) to begin work on a 
new protocol based on incoming data.58 In the interim period between Vi-
enna and a new convention, the data continued to demonstrate a link be-
tween CFCs and ozone depletion.59 In 1985, researchers in Antarctica found 
that CFCs and other chemicals created a substantial gap in the ozone layer, 
leaving the Antarctica without any protection from UV rays.60 In addition, 
the UNEP’s completed series of reports, published in 1986, concluded that 
the concentration of certain CFCs in the stratosphere doubled in the period 
between 1975 and 1985—the reports also predicted a nine percent decrease 
in the ozone layer by the year 2000.61 As international momentum to ban 
ODSs grew, so too did the scientific consensus that the regulations should 
begin with CFCs.62 
C. The Montreal Protocol 
On September 16, 1987, twenty-four countries signed the Montreal 
Protocol, a watershed moment in ozone regeneration and international envi-
ronmental law.63 The final treaty adopted a “command and control” frame-
                                                                                                                           
 54 Jennifer S. Bales, Transnational Responsibility and Recourse for Ozone Depletion, 19 B.C. 
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 259, 267–68 (1996). 
 55 21 C.F.R. § 2.125 (2016); Elias Mossos, The Montreal Protocol and the Difficulty with 
International Change, 10 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK J. 1, 7 n.22 (2005). 
 56 Matthew I. Kupferberg, Fixin’ A Hole: Recent Attempts by the European Community to 
Preserve the Ozone Layer, 17 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 165, 168 (1994); Jeffrey J. Renzulli, 
The Regulation of Ozone-Depleting Chemicals in the European Community, 14 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 345, 347 (1991).  
 57 David A Wirth, A Matchmaker’s Challenge: Marrying International Law and American 
Environmental Law, 32 VA. J. INT’L L. 377, 384 (1992). 
 58 Ling, supra note 47, at 94–95. 
 59 Gallagher, supra note 27, at 275. 
 60 Nangle, supra note 28, at 545. 
 61 Gallagher, supra note 27, at 274–75; Landers, supra note 10, at 462. 
 62 See Gallagher, supra note 27, at 274. 
 63 Sean Cumberlege, Multilateral Environmental Agreements: From Montreal to Kyoto—A 
Theoretical Approach to an Improved Climate Change Regime, 37 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 
303, 312 (2009). The Montreal Protocol’s procedural framework has been exalted as a model for 
other international environmental agreements. See Chris Peloso, Crafting an International Climate 
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work to regulate the consumption of CFCs.64 First, the treaty required that 
five of the most harmful CFCs be reduced to 1986 consumption levels.65 
Second, the treaty created a timetable for a gradual fifty percent reduction 
of CFC consumption by the year 2000.66 To verify compliance, Article 7 of 
the Montreal Protocol requires countries to annually provide the Secretariat 
of the UNEP with statistical data on their production, imports, and exports 
of CFCs.67 The treaty also included a provision to promote further research 
                                                                                                                           
Change Protocol: Applying the Lessons Learned from the Success of the Montreal Protocol and 
the Ozone Depletion Problem, 25 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 305, 306–07 (2010) (advocating to 
apply structural elements of the Montreal Protocol to existing agreements combat climate change 
caused by greenhouse gases); Olga Goldberg, Note, Biodegradable Plastics: A Stopgap Solution 
for the Intractable Marine Debris Problem, 42 TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 307, 308 (2012) (proposing an 
international agreement, modeled after the Montreal Protocol, to manage a field of debris in inter-
national waters known as the “Garbage Patch”); Theron A. Mehr, Comment, International Tech-
nology Transfer: Constructing and Financing an Environmental Program, 15 LOY. L.A. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 731, 742 (1993) (arguing for other international environmental regimes to adopt finan-
cial assistance infrastructure similar to the Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund). 
 64 Bruce Pasfield & Elise Paeffgen, How to Enforce a Carbon Tax: Lessons from the Montre-
al Protocol and the U.S. Experience with the Ozone Depleting Chemicals Tax, 14 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 
389, 393 (2013). Command and control describes a model of regulation in which governmental 
bodies impose specific requirements on polluters, such as limits on pollution and emissions from 
individual sources. Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous 
Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 104 (1998). In the United 
States, this model has been prominent in federal environmental legislation. Michael A. Livermore, 
Reviving Environmental Protection: Preference-Directed Regulation and Regulatory Ossification, 
25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 318 (2007). For instance, the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) utilizes a com-
mand and control model to mandate compliance with emissions levels based on a “best available 
technology” standard, with corresponding penalties for noncompliance. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A) 
(2012); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in 
the New Era of Environmental Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 515, 526 (2004). The Montreal Protocol’s 
model based on meeting specific production levels differs from a market-based best available 
technology standard, which adjusts emissions limits based on the capacity of existing emissions 
technology available for a particular source. Thoms, supra note 46, at 810; Michael P. Vanden-
bergh, An Alternative to Ready, Fire, Aim: A New Framework to Link Environmental Targets in 
Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803, 834 (1997); see 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(A). 
 65 Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 2; Thoms, supra note 46, at 802. The five most 
harmful CFCs that were in this most aggressive reduction schedule were CFCs 11, 12, 13, 113, 
114, and 115. Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 2, annex A; Thoms, supra note 46, at 802 
n.33. 
 66 Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 2; Thoms, supra note 46, at 802. CFCs are listed in 
Group I of two groups of ozone depleting substances (“ODSs”) scheduled for reduction in the 
Montreal Protocol. Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at Annex A–F. Group I contains the most 
common ODSs, such as CFCs, hydrochlorofluorocarbons (“HCFCs”), and now the majority of 
hydrofluorocarbons, (“HFCs”), while Group II contains ODSs such as halons, which although are 
more dangerous for the ozone layer, are produced in far fewer quantities. Raicyk, supra, note 31, 
at 369; see Robert W. Hahn & Albert M. McGartland, The Political Economy of Instrument 
Choice: An Examination of the U.S. Role in Implementing the Montreal Protocol, 83 NW. U. L. 
REV. 592, 593 n.3 (1989) (describing the Montreal Protocol’s treatment of halons). 
 67 Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 7; Gallagher, supra note 27, at 288. 
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and the ability to amend the banned substances list should new ozone de-
pleting substances arise.68 
The Montreal Protocol also included specific concessions to address the 
unique needs of developing countries, known as Article Five Parties.69 Spe-
cifically, developing countries that accepted the treaty received a ten-year 
deferral to meet the treaty’s obligations, and were allowed to increase con-
sumption of CFCs while working to decrease production.70 This grace period 
provided developing nations with the opportunity to begin compliance, but 
made concessions for delays related to the developing countries’ limited fi-
nancial resources.71 
Since its inception in 1987, the signatories have grown from twenty-four 
to nearly two hundred countries.72 The treaty has been updated five times as 
scientists have developed a greater understanding of ozone depletion.73 Most 
recently, the parties ratified the Kigali Amendments, which incorporated 
HFCs into the broader framework of the Montreal Protocol.74 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Cumberlege, supra note 63, at 312–13. 
 69 Hurlbut, supra note 49, at 352; see Article Five Parties Status, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME 
OZONE SECRETARIAT, http://ozone.unep.org/en/article-5-parties-status [https://perma.cc/FMP8-
A5U9]. 
 70 Gallagher, supra note 27, at 286. The original Montreal Protocol provided one qualification 
on developing countries to utilize the grace period solely “in order to meet [their] basic domestic 
needs.” ANITA MARGRETHE HALVORSSEN, EQUALITY AMONG UNEQUALS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 88 (1999). 
 71 Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 5, 10; Bafundo, supra note 9, at 464; Mark A. 
Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International Environmental Law, 76 TUL. L. REV. 
843, 865–66 (2002); Alice L Bodnar, Note, NRDC v. EPA: Testing the Waters of the Constitu-
tionality of Delegation to International Organizations, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 895, 901–02 (2007). 
 72 Treaties and Decisions: Status of Ratification, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME OZONE SECRETARI-
AT, http://ozone.unep.org/en/treaties-and-decisions/ [https://perma.cc/F956-GUP9]. 
 73 Thoms, supra note 46, at 804. The Montreal Protocol officially went into force on January 
1, 1989, following formal ratification by twenty-nine countries, as well as the European Commis-
sion. Montreal Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 16; Pamela S. Chasek, The Ozone Depletion Regime, 
in GETTING IT DONE: POSTAGREEMENT NEGOTIATION AND INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 187, 195 
(Bertram I. Spector & I. William Zartman, eds., 2003). In keeping with its goal of substantial 
reduction of CFCs based on international cooperation, the treaty did not go into effect until 
enough parties to represent at least two-thirds of global CFC consumers formally ratified the trea-
ty. Chasek, supra, at 194–95. By the time the Montreal Protocol went into force, approximately 
eighty-three percent of global CFC consumers had formally ratified the agreement. Id. at 195. 
 74 Kigali Amendment, supra note 12, at annex I; see infra notes 145–169 and accompanying 
text (outlining the provisions of the Kigali Amendment). 
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D. Incorporation of the Montreal Protocol into the  
American Statutory Framework 
The United States has integrated its obligations under the Montreal 
Protocol into some of its environmental and tax statutes..75 For example, 
Title VI of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) made ozone protection a part of the 
American environmental protection framework and adapted the “command 
and control” model of the Montreal Protocol to the American law enforce-
ment and tax systems.76 Title VI divides ODSs into two classes.77 Class I 
substances, which have a minimum ozone depletion potential of 0.2, are 
generally considered to be the most dangerous to the ozone layer.78 Class II 
substances, which largely consist of later-generation chemicals such as hy-
drochlorofluorocarbons (“HCFCs”), are generally considered safer for the 
ozone than Class I substances.79 Under 42 U.S.C. § 7671c, Congress set the 
timeframe for a reduction in the permissible production and consumption of 
Class I substances, with the deadline of January 1, 2000—on that date, pos-
session of all Class I substances became unlawful.80 For Class II substances, 
42 U.S.C. § 7671d set forth an extended reduction schedule, with produc-
                                                                                                                           
 75 Pasfield & Paeffgen, supra note 64, at 394; see Elspeth Faiman Hans, Note, The Montreal 
Protocol in U.S. Domestic Law: A “Bottom Up” Approach to the Development of Global Adminis-
trative Law, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 827, 838 (2013). 
 76 Pasfield & Paeffgen, supra note 64, at 394; see Arkema, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 618 
F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (outlining Title VI’s statutory scheme); Andrew D. Finkelman, The 
Post-Ratification Consensus Agreements of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol: Law or Politics? 
An Analysis of Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 93 IOWA L. REV. 665, 681 (2008) 
(noting the addition of methyl bromide into the CAA following its incorporation into the Montreal 
Protocol); Steven J. Shimberg, Stratospheric Ozone and Climate Protection: Domestic Legislation 
and the International Process, 21 ENVTL. L. 2175, 2176 (1991) (explaining that the timing of the 
CAA’s passage intentionally predated the talks leading to the Montreal Protocol by only a few 
weeks). 
 77 42 U.S.C. § 7671a (2012); Adams, supra note 34, at 190–91. 
 78 42 U.S.C. § 7671a; Adams, supra note 34, at 191. The term “ozone depletion potential” 
refers to the numerical factor that describes the ability of a substance to destroy atmospheric ozone 
as compared to the baseline figure for CFC-11. 42 U.S.C. § 7671(10); see Kriangsak Kittichairsa-
ree, Using Trade Sanctions and Subsidies to Achieve Environmental Objectives in the Pacific Rim, 
4 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 296, 321 n.87 (1993). The numerical factor of ozone deple-
tion potential is based on a mass to kilogram ratio that incorporates the substance’s atmospheric 
lifetime, its molecular weight, and rate of dissociation in the atmosphere. 42 U.S.C. § 7671(10); 
Patrick Turley, Ozone Depletion: International Protective Strategies and Implications, 12 U. ARK. 
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 301, 305 n.37 (1990). 
 79 42 U.S.C. § 7671a; Jones, supra note 4, at 827. The same chemical companies that origi-
nally designed CFCs largely designed their replacements, as well. BRIAN J. GAREAU, FROM PRE-
CAUTION TO PROFIT: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE 
MONTREAL PROTOCOL 80 (2013). In fact, by 1988, DuPont had already patented multiple pro-
cesses to design HFCs that would replace certain CFC counterparts. Id. at 81; see Elf Atochem N. 
Am., Inc. v. LaRoche Indus., Inc., 85 F. Supp. 2d 336, 337 (D. Del. 2000) (litigating a patent dis-
pute over one HFC developed as an alternative to CFCs in the wake of the Montreal Protocol). 
 80 42 U.S.C. § 7671c. 
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tion and consumption of the substances becoming completely unlawful after 
December 31, 2030.81 
The United States also implemented a dual enforcement model through 
Title VI.82 Title VI makes Class I substances, like CFCs, “controlled sub-
stances” under the CAA.83 This designation allows EPA to closely regulate 
the production, consumption, import, and export of such substances, and au-
thorizes the United States government to impose criminal and civil penalties 
for violations.84 In addition, the United States implemented an excise tax on 
CFCs.85 This excise tax is progressive on producers and importers of CFCs, 
and between 1995 and 2016 the tax nearly tripled.86 Congress enacted two 
exemptions to the CFC excise tax, however.87 First, I.R.C. § 4662(e)(1)(A) 
provides an export exemption, which removes the excise tax for “sale[s] by 
the manufacturer or producer of [CFC–113] for export, or for resale by the 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. § 7671d. 
 82 Jones, supra note 4, at 825, 828. The federal government made a concerted effort to inform 
the public about this enforcement model, as well as the negotiation process, on regular intervals 
throughout the negotiation process in Montreal. Hans, supra note 75, at 840–41. The Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) regularly published updates of the negotiation process in the Federal 
Register. Id. 
 83 Pasfield & Paeffgen, supra note 64, at 395. 
 84 Nangle, supra note 28, at 565. The CAA permits parallel civil and criminal proceedings in 
penalizing violations of Title VI. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3) (2012). 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b) outlines the 
possible civil penalties for violations of Title VI, which include fines of up to twenty-five thou-
sand dollars per day for a violation. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(b); Nangle, supra note 28, at 565; C. Rus-
sell H. Shearer, Practical Considerations in the Domestic Sale of CFCs and HCFCs, NAT. RES. & 
ENV’T, Spring 1997, at 58, 62 (noting that under this statutory scheme, transacting for four canis-
ters of a Class I CFC could risk a civil fine of up to one hundred thousand dollars per day). Con-
gress outlined the possible criminal penalties for violations of Title VI and specified that violators 
can receive a sentence of up to five years and risk further fines. 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1); see United 
States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1188 (9th Cir. 2008) (outlining the statutory and regulatory 
framework utilized in the conviction of an ODS smuggler); 40 C.F.R. § 82.4 (2016) (providing 
EPA’s regulatory framework for the phaseout of ODSs and the timeline for prohibitions on pro-
duction or import of ODSs). 
 85 United States v. Shellef, 732 F. Supp. 2d 42, 45 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); Jones, supra note 4, at 
828; see Mystica M. Alexander et al., Sustainability & Tax Policy: Fixing a Patchwork of Policies 
with a Coherent Federal Framework, 35 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 27–28 (2016) (providing a brief over-
view of the ozone excise tax framework); Janet E. Milne, Environmental Taxation in the United 
States: The Long View, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 417, 429–30 (2011) (presenting the ODS 
excise tax as a model for future environmental taxes); Jason Spitzer & Adam Rosner, IRS Taking 
Firm Approach to Ozone-Depleting Chemical Excise Tax, TAX ADVISER (July 1, 2010), http://
www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2010/jul/clinic-story-01/ [https://perma.cc/BQZ8-P3EJ] (advising 
ODS producers on strategies for compliance with the excise tax). 
 86 I.R.C. § 4681(b) (2012); Pasfield & Paeffgen, supra note 72, at 396; Ozone Depleting Chemi-
cals (ODC) Excise Tax Audit Techniques Guide, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., (July 26, 2016), 
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/ozone-depleting-chemicals-odc-
excise-tax-audit-techniques-guide [https://perma.cc/M7WG-EMLA]. 
 87 I.R.C. §§ 4662(e)(1)(A), 4682(d)(1) (2012). 
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purchaser to a second purchaser for export.”88 Second, I.R.C. § 4682(d)(1) 
provides a recycling exemption for ODSs that had already been produced and 
were recovered from machinery or storage in the United States.89 
E. Unleashing a Black Market of Ozone-Depleting Chemicals 
Despite its success, the Montreal Protocol did have one major unin-
tended consequence: the rise of the illegal trafficking of CFCs.90 Because 
the Montreal Protocol required phasing out the production of ozone deplet-
ing substances, the demand for existing CFCs rose exponentially, prompting 
illicit sales into developed nations, such as the United States.91 Domestic 
and international entities began conspiring to import CFCs into the United 
States, bypassing the CAA and the excise tax.92 By the late 1990s, contain-
ers of CFCs that cost thirty-five dollars to produce could be sold in the 
United States for upwards of five hundred dollars.93 With this enticing profit 
margin, both importers and smugglers strove to import massive quantities of 
the illegal chemicals, with an estimate of over nine thousand tons of CFCs 
illegally entering the United States every year.94 CFC smuggling is particu-
larly strong from the world’s leading producer of refrigerant chemicals: 
China.95 One U.N. report from 2013 estimated that 3700 tons of illegal re-
                                                                                                                           
 88 Id. § 4662(e)(1)(A); see id. § 4682(d)(3)(A) (incorporating by reference I.R.C. § 4662(e)) 
(including the export tax exception from § 4662(e) in the taxation scheme for CFCs). 
 89 Id. § 4682(d)(1). Only one case has considered what constitutes a recycled ODS for the pur-
pose of this exemption. See F.R.C. Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 278 F.3d 641, 643–44 (6th Cir. 2002); 
Hans, supra note 75, at 844–45. In F.R.C. International, Inc. v. United States, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a lower court’s decision, holding that imports of ODS re-
covered from machinery in China and shipped to the United States did not qualify for the recycling 
exemption. 278 F.3d at 643–44. 
 90 Jones, supra note 4, at 830. 
 91 Bafundo, supra note 9, at 482. 
 92 DeSombre, supra note 3, at 65. 
 93 Landers, supra note 10, at 472–73. 
 94 Id. at 472; see Matthew L. Wald, Group Sees Ozone Danger in Illicit Chemical Trade, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/17/us/group-sees-ozone-danger-
in-illicit-chemical-trade.html [https://perma.cc/HL6J-Q4RH] (noting CFC smuggling concerns in 
the United States). 
 95 Jonathan M. Winer, Globalization, Terrorist Finance, and Global Conflict: Time for a 
White List?, 4 EUR. J. L. REFORM 255, 266 n.17 (2002); Landers, supra note 10, at 477. In recent 
years, the Chinese government has fulfilled its diplomatic responsibilities under the Montreal 
Protocol more actively, ranging from the symbolic (hosting the Meeting of Parties in 1999) to the 
substantive (openly supporting negotiations to include HFCs in the Montreal Protocol framework). 
Stephen O. Anderson & Ian J. Porter, Chinese Political, Social and Economic Leadership in Pro-
tection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer, Climate, and Biosecurity: A Montreal Protocol Case 
Study, PROCEDIA—SOC. & BEHAV. SCI., Apr. 2013, at 237, 242. 
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frigerant chemicals were exported from China and East Asia every year, 
worth more than sixty-eight million dollars.96 
Smugglers took advantage of the deficient customs enforcement 
schemes to import the illegal chemicals.97 For instance, smugglers deliber-
ately mislabeled the contents of imported substances to bypass regulators 
and inspectors.98 The CAA’s CFC amendments require accurate labeling of 
Class I and Class II substances, as well as products containing Class I sub-
stances.99 Smugglers circumvented the CAA’s ozone-depleting substances 
regulations by falsely labeling unused chemicals as “recycled” to forego 
excise tax requirements for virgin CFCs.100 Both of these tactics require 
little expertise, labor, or cost on the part of fabricators, and customs officials 
cannot easily differentiate between virgin and recycled CFCs.101 Further-
more, because CFCs are odorless gases stored in containers similar to other 
industrial gases, it is difficult for customs agents or other officials to verify 
the contents of a container.102 
In addition to falsely labeling the contents of shipments containing 
CFCs, smugglers have imported ozone-depleting chemicals into the United 
States through false transshipment reports.103 This method of fraud involves 
smugglers shipping the CFC containers to American ports with false bills of 
lading, which falsely state that the containers are in transit to a foreign des-
tination.104 These containers never reach their listed destinations.105 Instead, 
they remain in the United States, ready to be distributed to buyers without 
paying any excise tax.106  
Similarly, smugglers have used complicated shipping routes to obfus-
cate the contents of shipping containers through a process called triangula-
                                                                                                                           
 96 U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME IN EAST ASIA 
AND THE PACIFIC: A THREAT ASSESSMENT 104 (2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-
and-analysis/Studies/TOCTA_EAP_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3WJM-NBK2]; Nussbaum, supra 
note 6, at 3375; see U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, ILLEGAL TRADE IN OZONE DEPLETING SUB-
STANCES: ASIA AND PACIFIC REGION 16–17 (2007), http://www.unep.fr/ozonaction/information/
mmcfiles/6075-e-illegal-trade-asia.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WJL-NFVQ] (providing some instances 
of Chinese law enforcement’s increased efforts to combat transnational smuggling of illegal chem-
icals). 
 97 Landers, supra note 10, at 473. 
 98 Id. 
 99 42 U.S.C. § 7671j(b) (2012). Specifically, the label must feature a warning label that states: 
“Contains [regulated substance], a substance which harms public health and environment by de-
stroying ozone in the upper atmosphere.” Id. 
 100 Pasfield & Paeffgen, supra note 64, at 399. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Saab, supra note 8, at 653. 
 103 Pasfield & Paeffgen, supra note 64, at 400. 
 104 Saab, supra note 8, at 649. 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. 
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tion.107 In triangulation, shipping containers are sent to a developing coun-
try producing CFCs, fraudulently loaded with the chemicals while labeled 
as another product, and then returned to the United States.108 Through these 
methods, smugglers and consumers of CFCs can reap massive benefits by 
circumventing the excise tax.109 
F. Domestic and International Responses to CFC Smuggling 
The majority of illegal CFCs coming into the United States were pro-
duced in developing nations that were parties of the Montreal Protocol.110 
While developed nations could bear the cost of investing in CFC substitutes 
and retrofitting equipment to comply with the Montreal Protocol, developing 
countries required financial assistance.111 This financial strain provided a ma-
jor conflict for developing nations, as worldwide demand for CFCs remained, 
but wealthier nations stopped production.112 Major developing countries, in-
cluding India and China, expressed dissatisfaction with the level of assistance 
they received from developed countries.113 In response to these criticisms, the 
ninety-six attending nations of the Second Meeting of the Parties to the Mon-
treal Protocol negotiated additional financial support mechanisms that were 
implemented through amendments to the agreement.114  
                                                                                                                           
 107 Bafundo, supra note 9, at 484–85. 
 108 Pasfield & Paeffgen, supra note 64, at 400. 
 109 DeSombre, supra note 3, at 65. 
 110 See Bafundo, supra note 9, at 481–82. 
 111 Ling, supra note 47, at 110. 
 112 DeSombre, supra note 3, at 63–64. 
 113 Ling, supra note 47, at 96–97. Indian Environmental Minister Maneka Gandhi specifically 
expressed frustration with the fact that the majority of intellectual property for ozone-friendly 
technologies belongs to American and European corporations, forcing developing countries to pay 
for access to these technologies that are necessary for compliance. BENEDICK, supra note 52, at 
189. Nonetheless, the Indian and Chinese representatives ultimately agreed in London that their 
nations would join the Montreal Protocol, thereby fulfilling a major goal for the organizers of the 
Second Meeting. Dale S. Bryk, The Montreal Protocol and Recent Developments to Protect the 
Ozone Layer, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 287–88 (1991); see David D. Caron, Protection of 
the Stratospheric Ozone Layer and the Structure of International Environmental Lawmaking, 14 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 755, 761 (1991) (noting the emphasis non-Article Five coun-
tries had on including China and India in order for the Montreal Protocol to succeed). 
 114 Royal C. Gardner, Exporting American Values: Tenth Amendment Principles and Interna-
tional Environmental Assistance, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 34 (1998); see Mossos, supra note 
55, at 25 (highlighting the need for a financial mechanism to aid developing countries prior to the 
adoption of the London Amendments). The London Amendments also added new CFCs and a 
series of other ODSs to the list of controlled substances. Joel A. Mintz, Comment, Progress To-
ward a Healthy Sky: An Assessment of the London Amendments to the Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 16 YALE J. INT’L L. 571, 579 (1991). The chemicals added 
in London, while not CFCs, still had an adverse effect on the ozone layer in a manner similar to 
CFCs. Lori B. Talbot, Comment, Recent Developments in the Montreal Protocol on Substances 
that Deplete the Ozone Layer: The June 1990 Meeting and Beyond, 26 INT’L L. 145, 148–49 
(1992). 
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The primary financial support mechanism for developing countries 
was the Montreal Protocol’s Multilateral Fund, which subsidized the cost of 
retrofitting equipment and replacing CFCs in developing countries.115 The 
Multilateral Fund has largely been a successful mechanism for sponsoring 
global reduction in CFCs and other ODSs.116 As of July 16, 2016, the Multi-
lateral Fund approved more than $3.3 billion in funding for over 7600 ODS 
reduction projects in the developing world.117 
In response to the illicit CFC trade, the United States and other devel-
oped nations set out to prosecute offenders and curb the illegal CFC 
trade.118 The United States formed an interagency task force with agents 
from EPA, U.S. Customs and Immigration Service, and the Internal Reve-
nue Service.119 This joint interagency effort, dubbed “Operation Cool 
Breeze,” and subsequently “Operation Catch-22” was largely successful, 
and in its first complete year of operation led to the seizure of over five 
hundred tons of illegal CFCs, valued at forty million dollars in lost tax rev-
enue.120  
In addition to the arrest of CFC smugglers, the United States engaged 
in a hard tack of heavily prosecuting corporations and individuals that either 
facilitated the shipments or purchased them.121 The United States first suc-
cessfully prosecuted a CFC smuggler in July 1995, when Adi Dara Dubash 
pleaded guilty in the United States District Court for the Southern District 
of Florida to illegally importing 8400 containers of CFCs.122 American law 
enforcement forces have even secured one extradition for a smuggler who 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Drumbl, supra note 71, at 867–68. 
 116 Id.; see James A. Bove, A Study of the Financial Mechanism of the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, 9 ENVTL. L. 399, 410 (2003) (highlighting that, as of 
2002, the Multilateral Fund approved nearly four thousand projects in 124 countries). But see 
Edith Brown Weiss, The Five International Treaties, A Living History, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: 
STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 89, 150–52 
(Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) (noting that the Multilateral Fund had 
initial difficulties both securing funding from developed countries and approving projects present-
ed by developing countries). 
 117 U.N. Env’t Programme, Report of the Executive Committee of the Multilateral Fund for 
the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol to the Twenty-Eighth Meeting of the Parties, ¶ 24, 
U.N. Doc. UNEP/OzL.Pro.28/10 (July 16, 2016). 
 118 Saab, supra note 8, at 650. 
 119 Landers, supra note 10, at 474. 
 120 Jennifer Clapp, The Illegal CFC Trade: An Unexpected Wrinkle in the Ozone Protection 
Regime, 9 INT’L ENVTL. AFF. 259, 267 (1997); Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Miami Man Sen-
tenced to 18 Months in Prison for Smuggling Refrigerant (July 29, 2011), https://archive.epa.gov/
epapages/newsroom_archive/newsreleases/09f9aa1eb2cceae9852578dc0053adc6.html [https://
perma.cc/W7LJ-CK5X]. 
 121 See Saab, supra note 8, at 650. 
 122 Earl E. Devaney & Michael J. Penders, A United States Perspective on Transboundary 
Investigations: Recent Cases and Essential Strategies for Interdiction of International Environ-
mental Crime, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN.: NAT’L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J., June 1996, at 26, 31. 
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fled the United States to Costa Rica to escape prosecution for illegal CFC 
imports.123 The prosecutions continued against businesses engaged in the 
purchase of smuggled CFCs.124 Through this enforcement regime govern-
ment officials have significantly diminished ODS smuggling in the United 
States.125 
G. The Next Generation of Chemicals: Reducing HFCs 
The Montreal Protocol is approaching its third decade in force and, 
following the Kigali Amendment, will begin to facilitate global reduction of 
another refrigerant material: HFCs.126 HFCs came into use following the 
removal of CFCs from commercial markets and have little effect on the 
ozone layer.127 Unfortunately, though, HFCs do cause adverse environmen-
tal effects.128 Despite their benefits in ozone reduction, HFCs, a type of 
greenhouse gas, are disastrous in terms of their global warming potential.129 
                                                                                                                           
 123 Jones, supra note 4, at 833–34. 
 124 See id. at 833. 
 125 Pasfield & Paeffgen, supra note 64, at 397–98; For instance, following one cooperative 
investigation by EPA, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the U.S. Customs and Immigration 
Service, federal prosecutors secured guilty pleas from four defendants for their involvement in a 
scheme that imported enough CFCs that would have otherwise warranted twenty-four million dollars 
in excise taxes. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Smugglers of Ozone Depleting CFCs Plead 
Guilty (Mar. 6, 2002), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2002/March/02_enrd_129.htm [https://
perma.cc/5PWK-5HJ4]. Similarly, in 2007 the president of one Florida chemical import corporation 
received a sentence of eighteen months in prison and $10,000 in fines for importing $1.4 million in 
ODSs over a three-month period. Press Release, supra note 120; see Lorraine Elliott, Smuggling 
Networks and the Black Market in Ozone Depleting Substances, in HAZARDOUS WASTE AND 
POLLUTION: DETECTING AND PREVENTING GREEN CRIMES 45, 49–50 (Tanya Wyatt ed., 2015) 
(noting concern for sustained demand for black-market ODSs in the developing world as it de-
creased in the United States and Europe). 
 126 See Kennedy, supra note 14, at 25. 
 127 Barbara A. Boczar, Avenues for Direct Participation of Transnational Corporations in 
International Environmental Negotiations, 3 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 29 (1994). In addition to pro-
duction for commercial use, HFCs have entered the atmosphere as a byproduct of some HCFCs. 
Daniel G. McCabe, Comment, Resolving Conflicts Between Multilateral Environmental Agree-
ments: The Case of the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, 18 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 442 
(2007). 
 128 Boczar, supra note 127, at 29. 
 129 Daniel Bodansky, The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A 
Commentary, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 451, 518 (1993); Mark W. Roberts & Peter M. Grabiel, A Win-
dow of Opportunity: Combating Climate Change by Amending the Montreal Protocol to Regulate 
the Production and Consumption of HFCs and ODS Banks, 22 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 
105 (2009). The term “global warming potential” refers to the capacity of a gas to contribute to the 
retention of heat in the earth’s atmosphere, measured by a ratio of the gas’s potential to trap heat 
as compared to an equal amount of carbon dioxide. Nicholas DiMascio, Credit Where Credit is 
Due: The Legal Treatment of Early Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions, 56 DUKE L.J. 1587, 
1606 n.103 (2007). The unit is used to compare disparate GHGs by their impact on the specific 
issue of global warming. Harro van Asselt & Joyeeta Gupta, Stretching Too Far? Developing 
Countries and the Role of Flexibility Mechanisms Beyond Kyoto, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 311, 349 
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Various HFCs have over one thousand times the climate impact of equiva-
lent amounts of carbon dioxide, with one particular strain 14,310 times more 
dangerous than carbon dioxide.130 HFCs have the potential to create a disas-
trous effect on the atmosphere and at current usage levels risk of raising the 
Earth’s temperature by approximately 0.5 degrees Celsius by 2100.131 
The United States has already begun to phase out HFC use.132 In July 
2015, EPA began enforcement of a new rule, which prohibits the use of 
HFCs when more environmentally sound alternatives exist, under its Signif-
icant New Alternatives Policy (“SNAP”) program.133 Furthermore, EPA has 
instituted a series of rules mandating strict reporting standards for the pro-
duction of the potent greenhouse gas HFC-23.134 In the final months of the 
Obama administration, EPA promulgated a rule incorporating HFCs into its 
regulatory framework for other ODSs used in refrigeration.135 As of May, 
                                                                                                                           
n.165 (2009). The deterioration of HFCs in the atmosphere has also been linked to the presence of 
another potent greenhouse gas, tetrafluoromethane, which has a global warming potential of 6600 
and remains in the atmosphere for fifty thousand years. Aaron M. Jubb et al., An Atmospheric 
Photochemical Source of the Persistent Greenhouse Gas CF4, 42 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 
9505, 9505 (2015). 
 130 INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE & TECH. & ECON. ASSISTANCE 
PANEL, IPCC/TEAP SPECIAL REPORT: SAFEGUARDING THE OZONE LAYER AND THE GLOBAL 
CLIMATE SYSTEM 8 (2005) [hereinafter IPCC/TEAP SPECIAL REPORT]; Daniel G. McCabe, supra 
note 127, at 443. The IPCC/TEAP report came as the result of cooperation between the Technolo-
gy and Economic Assistance Panel, the research apparatus of the Montreal Protocol, and the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change, a research organization formed by the United Nations 
and the World Meteorological Organization with a mandate to compile and analyze research relat-
ed to climate change. Jorge E. Vinuales, Legal Techniques for Dealing with Scientific Uncertainty 
in Environmental Law, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 437, 488 (2010); Roberts & Grabiel, supra, 
note 129, at 104. 
 131 U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE KIGALI 
AMENDMENT TO THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL 1 (2016), http://ozone.unep.org/sites/ozone/files/pdfs/
FAQs_Kigali-Amendment.pdf [https://perma.cc/YS82-W33U] [hereinafter KIGALI AMENDMENT 
FAQ]; see Justin Worland, Countries Reach Landmark Deal to Limit Global Warming from Air 
Conditioners, TIME (Oct. 15, 2016), http://time.com/4532377/climate-change-kigali-agreement-
air-conditioners/ [https://perma.cc/25G8-ECVX] (summarizing the Kigali Amendment); David 
Doniger, Countries Adopt Kigali Amendment to Phase Down HFCs, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL 
(Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/david-doniger/countries-adopt-kigali-amendment-
phase-down-hfcs [https://perma.cc/7JB6-MNAU] (discussing preliminary expectations of the 
Kigali Amendment). 
 132 Roberts & Grabiel, supra note 129, at 128. 
 133 40 C.F.R. § 82.170 (2016). This rule is currently being challenged by HFC manufacturers 
before the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Petition for Re-
view, Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 15-1328 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 15, 2015); Or-
der, Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 15-1328 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 13, 2016) (sched-
uling oral arguments for February 17, 2017); David Schultz, Will Trump Attorneys Defend Obama 
Climate Regulation?, 48 Env’t Rep. (BNA) 273 (Feb. 8, 2017) (discussing the Trump Administra-
tion’s potential handling of litigation relating to greenhouse gasses). 
 134 40 C.F.R. § 98.3 (2016). 
 135 Id. §§ 82.150–82.169. Two chemical industry organizations are challenging this rule. See 
Petition for Review, Air Permitting Forum v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, No. 17-01017 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 
2017] Preventing the Illicit (and Lucrative) Sale of Greenhouse Gases 543 
2017, the Trump administration had not issued any statements concerning 
the Kigali Amendment.136 
As it works towards reducing usage of HFCs in commercial products, 
the United States has also promoted research for more environmentally 
sound alternatives.137 In response to international concerns about the feasi-
bility of producing refrigerants with low global warming potential, the De-
partment of Energy conducted research at Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
to study the viability of these replacements in high-temperature environ-
ments.138 The final report from this research concluded that viable alterna-
tives do exist for common HFCs, and these alternatives have lower risks of 
exacerbating global warming.139 
The international community has also progressed in both individual ef-
forts to reduce HFC use.140 For instance, Canada instituted mandatory re-
porting requirements for production, imports, and exports of HFCs to gen-
erate data on national use before an international agreement.141 Similarly, 
Japan’s Fluorocarbon Recovery and Destruction Law mandates industry to 
report production, destruction, and storage of HFCs to the Japanese gov-
ernment to compile national statistics on HFC stockpiles and usage.142 Fur-
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thermore, in 2006, the European Commission instituted regulations that re-
quired all air-conditioned automobiles sold in member states to use refriger-
ants with a global warming potential of 150 or less beginning in 2011.143 
With these national restrictions in place, the parties to the Montreal Protocol 
were in position to craft a multilateral agreement to reduce HFCs.144 
H. The Kigali Amendment and Incorporation of HFCs into  
the Montreal Protocol 
The most significant movement toward global reduction of HFCs will 
ultimately come through the amended Montreal Protocol.145 On October 15, 
2016, in Kigali, Rwanda, the parties to the Montreal Protocol agreed to a 
formal amendment to the Montreal Protocol that will dramatically reduce 
the spread and use of HFCs.146 In adopting the Kigali Amendment, the par-
ties agreed to include HFCs within the broader framework of the Montreal 
Protocol and to adopt a schedule for dramatic cuts to the production and 
consumption of HFCs.147 
The Kigali Amendment’s primary change to the Montreal Protocol is 
the introduction of HFCs into the list of controlled substances that will be 
reduced over the coming decades.148 The amendment will come into force 
on January 1, 2019, and will schedule a reduction of HFC production and 
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consumption that is similar to the Montreal Protocol’s grace period for CFC 
reduction.149 
The Kigali Amendment requires non-Article Five countries, such as 
the United States, to reduce their HFC production and consumption based 
on annual average use in 2011, 2012, and 2013.150 By 2036, HFC produc-
tion and consumption will be reduced to fifteen percent of the baseline.151 A 
select number of other countries, notably the Russian Federation, will oper-
ate on a delayed version of this timetable, starting in 2020, but will be 
moved to the same schedule as the other non-Article Five countries by 
2029.152  
The Kigali Amendment also provides a bifurcated reduction schedule 
for Article Five Parties.153 First, the majority of Article Five Parties were 
placed on a delayed reduction schedule using a baseline calculated based on 
annual average use from 2020 to 2022 and requiring gradual reduction to 
begin in 2024.154 Ultimately the goal is for these countries to consume and 
produce up to twenty percent of their baseline by 2045.155 With this timeline 
in place, Article Five Parties have the opportunity to reduce production and 
consumption in a manner that better accommodates their limited re-
sources.156 
The Kigali Amendment made an exemption for Article Five Parties 
that are designated “high-ambient-temperature parties,” a select group of 
states located in the Middle East and South Asia.157 Specifically, these high-
ambient-temperature parties were allowed a more lenient reduction sched-
ule given the unique challenges to refrigeration that these, the hottest coun-
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tries in the world, face.158 The freeze on increased production is scheduled 
to stop from 2028 until 2031, and then consumption and production is sup-
posed to decrease to fifteen percent of the baseline by 2047.159 With this 
complete framework established, the parties to the Montreal Protocol each 
have their obligations delineated in the amended treaty.160 
The drafters and negotiators of the Kigali Amendment praised the final 
agreement, with former Secretary of State John Kerry proclaiming it “likely 
the single most important step we could take at this moment to limit the 
warming of our planet and limit the warming for generations to come.”161 
Leaders of developing states, particularly those most vulnerable to the onset 
of global climate change, also praised the agreement for both its future im-
pact and its accommodation of their financial needs.162 According to esti-
mates, the ultimate effect of the Kigali Amendment will be to remove the 
equivalent of seventy million tons of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, 
which should prevent global temperature increase.163 With the agreement 
established, the next step for the parties to the Montreal Protocol will be to 
ensure enforcement of the terms, including the prevention of illicit HFC 
smuggling.164 
The reduction of HFCs from the global market is directly analogous to 
the CFC removal process not only because of their mutual status within the 
Montreal Protocol, but also because of their dominant status in the refriger-
ant market at the time of the agreements to cut back on them.165 The prima-
ry similarity between CFCs and HFCs is that, just as CFCs were dominant 
in the market prior to the Montreal Protocol and were far more cost-
effective than less potent alternatives, similarly HFCs are currently the pri-
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mary refrigerant chemical used across the globe, and there are no more af-
fordable alternatives.166 
Although the use of HFCs has diminished in recent years within de-
veloped nations, particularly the United States, developing nations continue 
to use HFCs.167 Furthermore, the high initial cost of retrofitting HFC-
compatible equipment will incentivize smuggling of HFCs into the United 
States and throughout the developed world.168 With the parties to the Mon-
treal Protocol agreeing to the Kigali Amendment, the current challenge is to 
ensure the Montreal Protocol’s continued success and to prevent the detri-
mental impact of illicit smuggling.169 
II. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL  
AND SUBSEQUENT CFC SMUGGLING TO COMBAT  
THE ILLICIT TRADE OF HFCS 
To preemptively impede a possible black market of hydrofluorocar-
bons (“HFCs”) from entering the United States, domestic law enforcement 
officials should employ the approach that they belatedly used to confront 
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chlorofluorocarbon (“CFC”) smuggling.170 Aside from an instruction for the 
Multilateral Fund to include prevention of the illicit HFC trade in its budget 
allocation, the Kigali Amendment does not address the significant problem 
of smuggling, which may soon arise.171 That said, the United States and its 
fellow parties to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer (“Montreal Protocol”) still have opportunities to mitigate this 
threat using lessons learned from combatting CFC smuggling.172  
First, the United States must continue to ensure cooperation and the 
exchange of information amongst its law enforcement and environmental 
agencies.173 Next, the United States and other non-Article Five states must 
monitor their fellow parties to the Montreal Protocol to ensure compliance 
and promote anti-smuggling efforts through the Multilateral Fund.174 Next, 
the United States should press for the destruction of so-called “HFC 
Banks,” a potent source of the greenhouse gas.175 The United States, when 
approaching this problem, will also benefit from examining its enactment of 
other environmental laws, both domestic and international.176  
A. Domestic Law Enforcement 
Although EPA is primarily responsible for establishing regulations for 
reducing the use of ozone-depleting substance (“ODS”) under Title VI of 
the Clean Air Act (CAA), enforcing these regulations is a multi-agency ef-
fort.177 EPA and Customs demonstrated this joint commitment in March 
1996, when the two agencies signed a joint Memorandum of Understand-
ing, agreeing to share information and resources to combat CFC smug-
gling.178 The program was largely successful in halting new shipments of 
CFCs into the United States, and in 1997, the DOJ secured fifty criminal 
convictions and $38.1 million in civil fines for CAA ozone violations.179 
Unfortunately, this joint commitment toward combating CFC smuggling 
only arose after thousands of tons of illegal ozone-depleting chemicals en-
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tered the United States.180 To prevent this outcome with HFCs, the United 
States should adopt a more anticipatory approach and foster interagency 
cooperation on this specific issue from the outset.181 
In addition to a coordinated, multi-agency approach to combating HFC 
smuggling, American officials should continue to press for strong punish-
ments for smugglers, specifically through the possibility of prison sentences 
for individuals and heavy fines for corporate violators.182 Under the CAA, 
violating Class I controlled substance regulations, carries both civil and 
criminal penalties.183 These penalties can serve as significant disincentives 
for individuals to smuggle these substances and can actually encourage 
compliance with the CAA’s ozone laws.184 
B. Strengthening International Obligations 
In addition to combating HFC smuggling within the United States, pol-
icymakers must preemptively attack the illegal trade by hampering produc-
tion of the chemicals, particularly in the developing world.185 The original 
Montreal Protocol offered a lenient schedule for the reduction of CFC pro-
duction by developing countries, specifically through a ten-year grace peri-
od before being held to the agreement’s requirements.186 In theory, this 
grace period was a mutually beneficial term of the Montreal Protocol for 
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both developed and developing nations.187 For developing nations, the grace 
period provided sufficient time to invest in new industrial equipment that 
complied with the Montreal Protocol, and allowed them to remain con-
scious of other pressing financial needs.188 For wealthier nations, this grace 
period ensured the cooperation of developing nations, a crucial step in the 
success of the agreement.189 Despite these intentions, the grace period had 
major unintended consequences, spurring the production of CFCs in devel-
oping countries for illegal export to the United States and the European Un-
ion.190 Developing nations were producing CFCs at a far greater rate than 
they were consuming them domestically.191 By 1995, CFC production in 
Article Five countries had increased by 177% compared to 1985 production 
levels, but in that same period consumption increased by only forty-one 
percent.192 
The United States and other developed nations pressed for a reduced 
grace period duration similar to the five-year period they initially sought in 
the first Montreal Protocol negotiations.193 In the aftermath of the original 
Montreal Agreement, the ten-year grace period provided sufficient time for 
developing countries to change their capacity for non-CFC chemicals; how-
ever, it also provided sufficient time for producers to illegally ship these 
illegal chemicals across the globe.194 The Kigali Amendment did include 
extended grace periods for Article Five countries to reduce HFC production 
and consumption, specifically the five year delay on the freeze for most Ar-
ticle Five countries and the ten year delay for high-ambient-temperature 
Article Five countries.195 While these terms will provide some challenges 
for combating HFC smuggling, they were also a key part of the negotiations 
with highly populated developing nations, particularly India, and ultimately 
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ensure the participation of these countries in the Kigali Amendment.196 
Nonetheless, the extended grace periods will require policymakers to main-
tain their commitment to enforce international obligations and support devel-
oping countries through the Montreal Protocol’s financial mechanisms.197 
With this delayed rollout of HFC reduction in the developing world, 
policymakers should cultivate enforcement mechanisms and provide greater 
financial assistance for developing nations.198 Noncompliant nations have a 
variety of incentives not to comply with their obligations to reduce the use 
of ODS because they are driven by economic concerns that prioritize other 
domestic needs over environmental concerns.199 Noncompliant nations may 
be motivated by the high difficulty of monitoring compliance in a large 
multilateral agreement such as the current Montreal Protocol.200 Further-
more, with 197 parties currently subject to the treaty, noncompliant nations 
may defect out of a belief that this will be unnoticed.201 Currently, the Mon-
treal Protocol contains three central responses to noncompliance: assistance, 
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cautions, and suspensions.202 Yet, the parties within the Protocol have 
avoided the most serious option—a suspension—solely resorting to caution-
ing Russia in 1998 when it failed to meet its reporting requirements.203 In an 
HFC reduction scheme, the United States and other developed nations 
should retain the possibility of utilizing the noncompliance measures if a 
nation produces illegal chemicals in a way that fosters a black market.204 
C. Utilize the Multilateral Fund to Promote Compliance  
and Anti-Smuggling Efforts 
The United States and other industrialized nations must be strict to-
wards noncompliant nations, but also provide adequate support to less de-
veloped nations.205 Less financially sound nations may object to a more 
stringent enforcement regime on grounds that it would inevitably punish 
these nations because they lack the financial and institutional resources to 
combat illicit chemical production.206 To assuage these concerns, the United 
States and other developed nations should simultaneously preserve and ex-
pand upon the Multilateral Fund.207 The Multilateral Fund can provide de-
veloping nations with HFC substitutes, retrofitting equipment, and other 
tools for phasing out HFCs.208 Furthermore, the Multilateral Fund allows 
developing nations to fulfill their Montreal Protocol commitments without 
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diverting limited financial resources from other purposes.209 The United 
States and other developed countries can also choose to allocate portions of 
the extra twenty-seven million dollars they have committed to the Multilat-
eral Fund in exchange for implementation of the Kigali Amendment.210 This 
financial mechanism encourages participation in the agreement, while also 
reducing the risks that environmental protection will be sacrificed because 
of limited resources.211 
In addition to this monetary support, the United States should support 
developing nations in an HFC reduction scheme through technical and in-
formational support to its global law enforcement and environmental pro-
tection agencies.212 The current Montreal Protocol framework has already 
encouraged some coordination between multinational law enforcement 
agencies.213 For instance, the International Criminal Police Organization 
(“INTERPOL”)’s Working Group on Environmental Crime has organized 
information sharing between domestic law enforcement agencies across the 
globe.214 INTERPOL was a key conduit to the arrest and eventual extradi-
tion of one American smuggler.215 This support and information-sharing 
scheme, however, should not begin with the search for violators of the 
chemical reduction protocol, but rather, should extend to expediting a re-
duction in manufacture in developing nations.216 
D. Reducing HFC Banks 
In addition to combating the production of new HFCs, the parties of 
the Montreal Protocol should use its funding mechanisms to address HFC 
reserves, or banks.217 These banks consist of chemicals that have been pro-
duced but are not currently in circulation and instead are either stored in 
tanks or in existing consumer products.218 For instance, chemicals produced 
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for the creation of foams and inside refrigeration machinery are retained in 
the foams or inside the refrigeration units.219 Even after the production ends 
because of international agreements, the chemicals remain in circulation, 
particularly when they already exist in storage containers, and are at risk of 
being smuggled across the globe.220 In addition to halting another source of 
HFCs from entering the global black market, the coordinated targeting of 
existing banks will have the ancillary benefit of reducing the amount of 
greenhouse gasses from the global environment.221 
While the Kigali Amendment does not include any provisions on the 
regulation of HFC banks, there is opportunity to reduce stored HFCs 
through the Montreal Protocol’s financial and technological assistance pro-
grams.222 Wealthier nations should utilize the positive reinforcement mech-
anisms within the Montreal Protocol to regulate existing banked HFCs.223 
Specifically, developed nations within the Montreal Protocol should utilize 
the agreement’s Multilateral Fund and disburse its funds for the purpose of 
financing a phase-out of HFC banks.224 At the moment, developing nations 
lack the capacity to finance the recovery of these banks, and they lack in-
centives to destroy existing equipment that is not subject to the Montreal 
Protocol.225 With financial incentives to recover stored HFCs and the re-
sources to comply with this program, developing countries will have the 
ability to recover stored ODS banks and destroy them in a manner that does 
not cause further greenhouse gas emissions.226 
E. Lessons from Other International Environmental Agreements 
As the United States attempts to proactively prevent the illicit trade of 
HFCs following the Kigali Amendment, it should also look to incorporate 
lessons from other environmental smuggling issues, specifically trades in 
hazardous waste and endangered species.227 For instance, enforcement of 
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the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) contains 
provisions permitting joint state and federal cooperation toward managing 
hazardous waste removal, including the construction and maintenance of 
waste treatment facilities.228 This joint state and federal monitoring and en-
forcement mechanism could be incorporated into an HFC reduction scheme, 
with federal agencies working with state counterparts to increase awareness 
of the signs of smuggling, and even to cooperate in the replacement and 
destruction of existing HFCs.229 
Furthermore, under the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (“CITES”), the United States issued 
trade sanctions against another nation for violating an international agreement 
that regulates the trade of endangered species.230 In 1994, the United States 
formally issued trade sanctions against Taiwan for violating CITES.231 The 
experience of the United States sanctioning a defector from an international 
environmental treaty in this instance demonstrates that there is a possibility of 
doing so again in the case of countries that deviate from an HFC agree-
ment.232 
F. Consequences of Inaction 
If the United States and the international community fail to prevent an 
illicit trade in HFCs, the results would be dangerous for the global envi-
ronment, the prevention of illegal behavior, and the legitimacy of multilat-
                                                                                                                           
 228 Jason M. Levy, Conflicting Enforcement Mechanisms Under RCRA: The Abstention Bat-
tleground Between State Agencies and Citizen Suits, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 373, 377 (2012). 
 229 See id. 
 230 Ruth A. Braun, Note, Lions, Tigers and Bears [Oh My]: How to Stop Endangered Species 
Crime, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 545, 557 (2000). 
 231 Id. at 557; see Amy E. Vulpio, From the Forests of Asia to the Pharmacies of New York 
City: Searching for a Safe Haven for Rhinos and Tigers, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 479–
82 (1999). The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna 
and the Montreal Protocol share other similarities. Gary D. Meyers & Kyla Seligsohn Bennett, 
Answering “The Call of the Wild”: An Examination of U.S. Participation in International Wildlife 
Law, 7 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 101 (1989). For instance, both can add items to the list of pro-
hibited chemicals or organisms through amendments approved by the signatory states. Id. Similar-
ly, both treaties elicited their own respective black markets of banned substances. Jonathan P. 
Kazmar, The International Illegal Plant and Wildlife Trade: Biological Genocide?, 6 U.C. DAVIS 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 105, 107 (2000). The trade in illegal wildlife has continued despite interna-
tional and domestic efforts to curb both imports and exports. Elizabeth R. Beardsley, Poachers 
with PCs: The United States’ Potential Obligations and Ability to Enforce Endangered Wildlife 
Trading Prohibitions Against Foreign Traders Who Advertise on eBay, 25 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y 1, 5 (2007). By 2006, the International Criminal Police Organization estimated that the 
global black market in wildlife was a six billion dollar annual industry. Id. 
 232 See Edith Brown Weiss, Understanding Compliance with International Environmental 
Agreements: The Baker’s Dozen Myths, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1555, 1565 (1999). 
556 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 44:525 
eral agreements such as the Montreal Protocol.233 The continued prolifera-
tion of HFCs through illegal means would lead to the hazardous result of 
maintaining the presence of an efficient greenhouse gas in the atmos-
phere.234 Maintaining even some emission of these greenhouse gases is far 
from an ideal result of any international framework aiming to remove these 
chemicals from the atmosphere.235 
In addition to hampering the environmental progress made by the 
Montreal Protocol, climate change agreements, and legislation, failure to 
combat a black market in HFCs would preserve a steady income stream for 
criminal enterprises.236 By the mid-1990s, a thirty-pound cylinder of CFCs, 
which could be purchased for thirty-five dollars in a developing nation, 
could be purchased for over five hundred dollars in the United States.237 
With such high profit margins from illegal behavior, preventing the illicit 
import of ozone depleting chemicals into the United States will remove a 
lucrative source of income for potential lawbreakers.238 Furthermore, 
preservation of a global HFC black market would effectively punish law-
abiding entities that pay higher prices for legal HFC replacements.239 As the 
spokesman for one industry group, the Alliance for Responsible Atmospher-
ic Policy, stated, the financial incentive to purchase cheaper illegal substi-
tutes “substantially discourag[ed] the shift to new materials or practices” 
following the Montreal Protocol.240 
In addition to these concrete threats from not aggressively preventing 
HFC smuggling, a failed policy to prevent the black market would have an 
adverse impact on the legitimacy of an otherwise successful environmental 
agreement.241 If legitimacy is viewed as the perceived success of a political 
regime, then the Montreal Protocol has largely established its legitimacy 
through sheer ability to achieve its stated goals reducing the level of global 
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CFCs and ameliorating atmospheric ozone levels.242 Unfortunately, the per-
sistent threat of a global black market may delegitimize the process of a 
multilateral regime such as the Protocol, and can possibly discourage future 
environmental efforts.243 If the global community wishes to continue the 
legacy of the Montreal Protocol through an HFC reduction, then it must 
continue to combat the global black market.244 
CONCLUSION 
In agreeing to the Kigali Amendment, the global community made a 
major step towards stemming the tide of climate change through the frame-
work of one of the great environmental agreements of the modern era, the 
Montreal Protocol. As the United States and its international partners move 
toward a global reduction in the use of hydrofluorocarbons (“HFCs”), they 
will be making a significant step toward an international solution to an in-
ternational problem. As the experience of the Montreal Protocol demon-
strated, however, even the most successful environmental agreements can 
have unintended consequences, and entities willing to reduce costs through 
illegal means will attempt to bypass the law. 
With the phase-out of chlorofluorocarbons (“CFCs”) from multilateral 
agreements came a wave of criminal activity, attempting to circumvent do-
mestic and international laws by illegally smuggling CFCs into the United 
States. Ultimately, American law enforcement and environmental officials 
jointly coordinated efforts to halt shipments of illegal CFCs and prosecute 
offenders, but the delay still had serious consequences, preserving a black 
market in ozone depleting chemicals. This prevented full restoration of the 
atmospheric ozone layer, causing adverse effects on the environment and 
public health across the globe. 
As the United States and other nations successfully expand the global 
ozone depleting substance regime to include HFCs, they have a significant 
opportunity to combat global warming through the reduction in a major 
greenhouse gas. Yet, a ban of chemicals such as HFCs in favor of other, ex-
pensive alternatives can risk provoking a new black market. Instead of sole-
ly reacting to an emergent black market in HFCs, American policymakers 
should emphasize preventing illicit ozone-depleting chemical production at 
the source, largely in the developing world. Through a combination of fi-
nancial and informational support and clear penalties for noncompliance, 
the international community can work to reduce global dependence on 
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HFCs. Within the United States, law enforcement and environmental pro-
tection forces can emphasize their unity to combating an initial wave of 
HFC smuggling, with stiff penalties for traffickers. 
Global warming and ozone depletion are two global problems that in-
herently require multilateral cooperation for their solutions. In the case of 
HFC smuggling, the United States and its global partners will be best 
served by learning from the experience of combating CFC smuggling and 
preventing its rise proactively. 
